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Abstract: What role does enforcement play in protecting the constitutional authority 
of international law? Can enforcement be understood as a specifically constitutional 
practice? I argue here that international law has a greater capacity for constitutional 
enforcement than sceptical accounts have tended to acknowledge. This argument is 
anchored in the institutional account of the authority of law offered by Hart and 
developed by MacCormick. This focuses on the official or administrative perceptions 
as the determinant of constitutional legitimacy, which offers a way to offset the 
scepticisms caused by gaps in the constitutional order. This establishes constitutional 
enforcement as a practice centred on and legitimated by the attribution of role 
responsibilities, rather than on the direct application or policing of the rules. I 
illustrate these arguments using the law of the sea, a domain where the functional 
difficulties of enforcement have always presented a challenge to international law’s 
claim to authority.  
 
Keywords: Enforcement, Constitutional Authority, Law of the Sea, International 
Institutions  
 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has, since before its inception, been 
widely regarded as a ‘constitution for the oceans’.1 The obligations the treaty sets out are 
structured by the challenge of effecting genuine oversight over activities in the ocean domain, 
the challenge of governing the global commons. Most importantly, it implies a change to the 
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 SV Scott, ‘The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans’ in AG Oude Elferink (ed), 
Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the role of the LOS Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 
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free seas principle which establishes a presumption in favour of open and unrestricted rights 
of access and limits on enforcement jurisdiction. But at the same time as heralding a potential 
revolution in the law of the sea, its claim to constitutional authority is far from settled. The 
practical difficulty of enforcing the rules in this geographically expansive domain gives one 
especially forceful reason for rejecting the claim that the oceans are now constitutionally 
governed. The weakness of enforcement becomes part of the argument for understanding the 
rules as, in practice, reliant on persuasion rather than coercion in order to claim authority.
2
  
 This target of this paper is this gloss on international enforcement. The sceptical 
position is that international law’s ‘hard’ ability to effect compliance as a key determinant of 
– and limitation on – its constitutional authority. An international legal regime may set out 
the rules for what is expected of actors operating in a given issue area, but it tends to lack a 
sufficiently rigorous parallel regime for sanctioning those failing to live up to their 
responsibilities, and this lack of a law-enforcing capacity is enough to discredit – or at least 
introduce serious doubts about – the practice of believing in international law’s binding 
authority.
3
 Debates about the constitutional nature of the law of the sea provide a useful 
touchstone for evaluating the broader issue of enforcement as a specific practice of global 
constitutionalism because of the assumed limits on enforcement implied by the free seas 
principle.
4
 The more specific issue this raises is whether institutional advances in 
international law enforcement have the capacity to genuinely develop the existing customary 
principles in a way that advances international law’s claim to constitutional authority. My 
argument is, ultimately, that the sceptical conception of enforcement fails because it doesn’t 
engage with the special function of constitutional enforcement, which is both to reflect and 
determine an institutional capacity to delegate public responsibilities. Analysed in these 
terms, the law of the sea is able to exert a much greater – although by no means perfect – 
claim to “command the commons”, helping to structure the delegation of responsibilities by 
and to a wide range of actors.  
Section I sets out the sceptical conception of enforcement, which uses the weakness of 
the current enforcement regime as a reason to doubt international law’s potential to reflect 
constitutional authority. Section II challenges this, arguing that focusing on the weakness of 
the enforcement regime – especially the measures available to effect compliance – is a 
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 See especially J Vogler, ‘Global Commons Revisited’ (2012) 3 Global Policy 1, 69. 
3
 See especially E Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2009). 
4
 These issues have also been explored in relation to a number of other legal regimes; see especially JL Dunoff 
and JP Trachtmann (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalization, International Law and Global Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009).    
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mistake. This is because the practice of constitutional enforcement isn’t concerned with 
compliance as much as with the institutional capacity to delegate special responsibilities. 
Section III applies this to the law of the sea, showing how the operation of constitutional 
responsibilities have traditionally been tied to a presumption in favour of the free seas, which 
undermines international law’s claims to constitutional authority in this domain. Section IV 
suggests that this is changing, and with it the institutional viability of constitutional 
enforcement practices, as the law of the sea is understood as an aspect of global commons 
law.  
 
I. Anti-Constitutional Enforcement  
 
There are a wider range of enforcement mechanisms available to international law than have 
traditionally been recognised by the international law ‘sceptic’. But on the face of it, they do 
seem to have a point about the role these practices play in constructing or reflecting 
international law’s constitutional authority. The sceptic’s traditional argument for denying the 
constitutional authority  of international law is that so many international legal obligations 
seem so patently unenforced and unenforceable.
5
 The suspicion is that lacking a credible 
enforcement regime international law can only have a formal type of authority, certainly not 
the kind of overweening social authority typically associated with a constitutional legal 
order.
6
 As Thomas Franck classically put it, ‘the international system is organized in a 
voluntarist fashion, supported by so little coercive authority.’7 Scepticism about the structural 
lack of coercive authority undergirds an assumption that the limited enforcement mechanisms 
available in the international order which do exist are of limited use in explaining 
international law’s authority. This cashes out in the belief that the authority of international 
law can only be persuasive, certainly not anything like the binding commands typically 
associated with obligations in a domestic constitutional order.   
This essentially persuasive character of international law becomes the source for a 
more general assertion that ‘ownership’ of the international legal order rests with political 
actors. These circumstances limit the constitutional effect enforcement practices can have on 
                                                 
5
 See E Posner (n 3); also MJ Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security and International Law 
(Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, Washington, D.C. and Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2010). 
6
 For a detailed overview of these arguments, see ME O’Connell, The Power and Purpose of International Law: 
Insights from the theory and practice of enforcement (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008).  
7
 T Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’, (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 705; for 
a different starting point see J Goldsmith and D Levinson, ‘Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law’, (2009) 122 Harvard Law Review 1791  
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the authority of international law.
8
 The basis of this claim is that enforcement powers do 
exist, but they are either not used, or are used in a way that undermines international law’s 
claim to constitutional authority.  For instance, universal jurisdiction provides states with the 
most sweeping of enforcement powers. But in one study looking at those clear cases of piracy 
over which states could have exercised universal jurisdiction to enforce the law shows that 
between 1998 and 2009 only 1.47% of cases were prosecuted.
9
 A marginal figure by any 
measure. Other more highly institutionalized attempts at enforcement attract the same sort of 
concerns. The raft of institutional mechanisms now dedicated to enforcing international 
criminal law suggests the difficulty with attributing a constitutional effect to international 
enforcement practices. Critical voices point to the various ways in which, despite the degree 
of institutionalisation, the actual process of enforcing international criminal law and 
successfully bringing individuals to justice remains contingent on the exercise of political 
power.
10
 This contingency feeds doubts about whether the existence of an  institutional 
mechanism for enforcement should be accepted as evidence of genuine advance in the 
structures of international enforcement, or simply old wine in new bottles. The sceptical 
claim, in other words, is that even highly institutionalized enforcement practices shouldn’t be 
taken as evidence of constitutional authority, merely as evidence of a context-limited political 
will for enforcement. 
This grounds a much broader reason to be sceptical about the constitutional effect of 
international enforcement practices. One of the central challenges to claims that international 
represents a constitutional type of authority is that enforcement practices seemingly justified 
by international law are so easily co-opted to serve subjective interests. As Anthony F. Lang, 
Jr. argues, enforcement practices are almost always validated by those undertaking them with 
reference to international legal rules.
11
 On the surface this can create the perception that more 
enforcement equates to a deeper constitutional order. The catch is that the international order 
lacks a body capable of establishing whether international legal rules are being legitimately 
enforced or whether the authority of international legal rules is being used as a nefarious 
cloak for the advancement of subjective political interests. From this perspective, for a 
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 On the link between international authority and the claims to ‘ownership’ of international law, see especially K 
Anderson, ‘The Rise of International Criminal Law: intended and unintended consequences’, (2011) 20 
European Journal of International Law 331-358 
9
 S Art and E Kontorovich, ‘Agora: Piracy Prosecutions: An Empirical Examination of Universal Jurisdiction 
for Piracy’ (July 2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 436.  
10
 G Simpson, Law, War and Crime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Polity, London, 2007); K Ainley, 
‘The International Criminal Court on trial’ (2011) 24 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 309-333. 
11
 AF Lang, Jr., Punishment, Justice and International Relations: Ethics and Order after the Cold War 
(Routledge, London, 2008). 
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practice of enforcement to be justified it needs to be first located as part of a wider 
constitutional order able to regularise and legitimate a punitive regime. What state practice 
shows is the gaps in such an order, and as such international law’s lack of an independent, 
institutional power to sets the terms of international constitutional authority.  
The sceptical worry goes even further than this, however. Because current punitive 
practices are of an ad hoc and sui generis character, and not the practice of a genuine 
constitutional order, international practices to enforce international law creates a situation 
where, rather than enforcement practices building up a constitutional world order 
characterised by the rule of law, enforcement instead retrenches a world order defined by 
power and power politics. Whatever the formal authority claimed by the institution of 
international law, the fact that the architecture of international law can’t provide definitive 
guidance or oversight about the legitimate means, mechanisms or agents empowered to 
enforce its strictures attacks the idea that international law has the normative authority to 
order international society. This includes validating enforcement practices as constitutional 
practices because, for the sceptic, without clearly accepted constitutional rules there is no 
basis for constitutional enforcement.  
This suggestion that we might be required to discount the constitutional effect of 
international law enforcement even where it looks as if international law is being effectively 
enforced – because this is in reality an expression of political power, or a function of the a 
lack of genuine constitutionality – creates real problems for any attempt to use enforcement 
practices as evidence of international law’s constitutional authority. It doesn’t seem to leave 
any room for an authoritative form for enforcement practice within the existing rules of 
international law which doesn’t collapse back into a flawed or facile constitutionalism. 
Scepticism about enforcement in this sense challenges the constitutional possibilities of 
international law, particularly the claim that disparate international enforcement practices 
might be seen as part of a constitution building process.   
 
II. Constitutional Enforcement 
 
In this section I set out an alternative to the sceptical conception of the link between 
enforcement and constitutional authority. H.L.A. Hart provides the clearest support for 
conceptualizing enforcement as a process of delegating the roles and responsibilities 
necessary for validating the institutional authority of a legal order. This includes, importantly, 
an understanding of enforcement as a practice that can be constitutional even in the absence 
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of empirical certainty regarding the constitutionality of the underlying rules. This isn’t a great 
surprise given Hart’s claim that the normative force of a legal order is something entirely 
distinct and prior to the question of whether or not the law is backed by a sanction or 
command. Sanctions, he argued, are necessarily the result of a normatively authoritative 
system of rules, not the basis for such a system. The crucial reason he gives for law’s 
normativity being protected in practice even in the absence of a  hard sanctioning mechanism 
is the presence of what he classically terms the ‘secondary rules’ of a legal order.12 Primary 
and secondary rules provide a rubric to describe the formal validity of a legal order.
 
Axiomatically, a legal order possessing both primary and secondary rules is able to protect 
the authority of legal obligations. Hart writes:  
‘Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or primary type, 
human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to 
or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary to the first; 
for they provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce 
new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways 
determine or control their operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of 
the second type provide for operations which lead not merely to physical movement 
or change, but to the creation or variation of duties or obligations’13 
 
Secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication function in this way as a remedy for 
the authority of the legal order, such that ‘all three remedies together are enough to convert 
the regime of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal system’.14 Importantly, however, 
secondary rules – including those enabling enforcement – are only a part of justifying the 
authority of the legal order. These rules are not essential to the legal order’s claim to 
authority. This is why Hart regards the customary basis of international law as sufficient to 
establish valid legal order, but as lacking the ‘full-blown’ practical authority law tends to 
have in the domestic context.     
The answer to the sceptical claims about the constitutional effect of enforcement 
comes from the manner in which Hart endows primary and secondary rules with the 
additional function of linking the formal, internal validity of the legal order to the broader 
constitutional role of the legal order. The reason the union of primary and secondary rules 
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 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2
nd
 edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).  
13
 See HLA Hart (n 12) 81. 
14
 See HLA Hart (n 12) 94. 
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provides evidence of the authority of the legal order is because they arise as part of a complex 
and deeply-embedded socio-theoretical conversation about the appropriate relationship 
between the different normative standards available in a social order, namely the competing 
standards operating in law, politics and morality. As such, the division between primary and 
secondary rules is not only a prescriptive picture of what any valid legal system needs, but 
also a way of understanding how, in practice, a legal order fits into the wider constitutional 
order. This suggests the important constitutional role the secondary rules – or, better,  
remedial rules – which confer, assign or entail rights and responsibilities of enforcement as 
enactors of a legal order. This is the meaning behind Hart’s warning that: ‘though the 
combination of primary and secondary rules merits, because it explains many aspects of the 
law, the central place assigned to it, this cannot by itself illuminate every problem. The union 
of primary and secondary rules is at the centre of a legal system; but it is not the whole, and 
as we move away from the centre we shall have to accommodate . . . elements of a different 
type’.15   
The challenge of incorporating these penumbral elements into a coherent legal theory 
led Neil MacCormick to develop Hart’s approach as part of a far-reaching account of the 
institutional grounding of legal authority (or, as Ronald Dworkin characterises it, as an 
approach to thinking about law as ‘a kind of social institution’).16 This in turn helps generate 
an account of the specific practice of constitutional enforcement. MacCormick argues that 
law’s social function – and it’s claim to constitutional authority – is determined by the 
capacity to provide ‘institutional normative order’.17 Whether the legal order has this capacity 
to claim constitutional authority will be determined by the degree to which it is ‘a genuinely 
observed source of the genuinely observed norms followed by those carrying out official 
public roles specified in or under it’.18 At one level this could be taken to say simply that law 
needs to be able to ‘inspire legality’.19 But this seems to suggest that the authority of law can 
be discovered through an empirical assessment of the ability of law to effect compliance, and 
with this to trigger the sceptical doubts regarding the evidence for the constitutional effect of 
enforcement. 
                                                 
15
 See HLA Hart (n 12) 99. 
16
 R Dworkin, ‘Hart and the concept of law’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review Forum 98. 
17
 N MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) 
18
 See (n 17) 46; see also HLA Hart (n 12) at 113: ‘The rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal 
validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of 
official behaviour by its officials’.   
19
 L Fuller, The Morality of Law (2
nd
 edn, Yale University, New Haven, 1964); see also J Brunnée and S Toope, 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2010), 6. 
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Hart – and MacCormick – decisively reject this idea as part of a broader dismissal of 
the role played by sanctions in generating the normative force of law; looking for empirical 
measures of law’s force, they argue, betrays a fundamental misunderstanding about the 
normativity of law.
20
 Law precedes compliance – and sanctions – not the other way around. 
The important thing to note for purposes of understanding the institutional dimension of the 
practice of constitutional enforcement is that a legal order’s constitutional authority is 
intimately tied to the presence of “officialdom”, actors with public roles and public 
responsibilities to enact the law. The capacity of these actors to effect compliance is beside 
the point. In order to establish a claim to authority law needs to be able to inspire legality in 
law’s officials. This is not a general appeal to law’s social acceptance, but a far more targeted 
appeal to those charged with enacting the law. The result is an institutional middle ground in 
which enforcement has a central role in determining constitutional authority, but at the same 
time makes clear the limited role that enforcement has to determine the normative content of 
the legal order. This presents what is in effect a ratchet-like, one-directional concept of 
enforcement; enforcement can strengthen constitutional authority but it can’t weaken or 
undermine it, either in its absence or because of problems in its application. Constitutional 
law doesn’t have to inspire obedience or compliance among its subjects; more important is 
that it inspires legality – as a culture of responsibility, rather than obedience – among those 
charged with enacting it.
21
 
Analysing enforcement through the lens of remedial rules help answer the sceptic’s 
concerns in three ways. First, the evidence for the constitutional (or anti-constitutional) 
quality of enforcement practices becomes a question to be answered with reference to 
institutional actors’ perception of the authority of the constitutional principles or rules, rather 
than something that can be dismissed by reference to either a general scepticism about the 
possibility of constitutional authority or a structural claim about the incompleteness or 
illegitimacy of set of the existence mechanisms for enforcement. Second, focusing on 
remedial rules highlights how essentially normative nature of enforcement in the context of 
constitutional law. Contrary to the scepticism of, for example, Jack Goldsmith and Daryl 
Levinson, constitutional law is not divorced from sanctions. It is simply prior to sanctions in 
setting who has the responsibility to enforce the law, in what circumstances, and within what 
limits. Third, this shifts the emphasis onto the descriptive task of capturing the available 
                                                 
20
 See especially Hart (n 12) 20-25; MacCormick (n 17) 51-52; critiquing the scholarly preoccupation with 
compliance with international law, see R Howse and R Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why 
International Law Really Matters’ (May 2010) 1:2 Global Policy 127-136.   
21
 Hart talks about this in the context of the ‘internal aspect’ of legal conduct, (n 12) 56-57.  
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institutional mechanisms for delegating responsibility. Instead of remaining mired in the 
general inadequacy or illegitimacy of existing enforcement practices, the principal emphasis 
rests on the functionality of a far more targeted range of institutionally allocated special 
responsibilities.  
In the context of international law this raises the question of agency. The traditional 
obstacle to extending this picture of constitutional enforcement to international law is that 
states are regarded as controlling the remedial roles available in the international legal order. 
The sceptic can plausibly argue that because of the prevailing sovereigntist structure there is 
no pay-off from reconceptualising enforcement as a remedial practice; if states are the 
responsible agents the end result is the same – a lack of constitutional enforcement. This is to 
see any remedial rules international law might have as, ultimately, failing to give effect to the 
supremacy required of a constitutional order. This isn’t possible so long as remedial rules are 
defined through a sovereign lens. It is too strong to say that states’ agency in enforcement 
necessary runs against an idea of the constitutional authority of international law. Some 
international and regional courts or tribunals are in fact recognized as exercising quite a thick 
standard of authority over states. But because this enforcement still tends to be channelled 
through – and limited by – the domestic constitutional order, it is difficult to attribute pre-
eminent or supreme type of authority to the international legal order, of the sort that marks 
out constitutional law.
22
   
One way of broadening out this question of agency is simply to deny that the 
involvement of states in the enforcement of international law does of necessity undermine the 
authority of international law. Mary Ellen O’Connell suggests exactly this in showing how 
international law has developed an extensive capacity for enforcement.
23
 These enforcement 
mechanism are evidenced by the application of armed measures, countermeasures and 
judicial measures in order to redress failures to comply with international law. These 
enforcement practices have both unilateral and collective roots in the international order but, 
crucially, are governed and ultimately legitimated by the strength and coherence of the 
underlying customary principles and an overarching commitment to the law’s authority. 
O’Connell argues that this commitment lies in that ‘we fundamentally accept the binding 
power of international law for the same reason we accept all law as binding. Our acceptance 
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 See for example Anne Peters, ‘Supremacy Lost: International Law meets domestic Constitutional Law’ 
(2009) 3 Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 170-198 
23
 See ME O’Connell (n 6)  
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of law is part of a tradition of belief in higher things.’24 This isn’t to suggest that these 
enforcement mechanisms are always used correctly, or are used as systematically as they 
could be, but it provides an answer to the sceptical claim that international law suffers from a 
structural lack of enforcement authority.  
In a different vein but to similar ends, Robert Scott and Paul Stephen point to how 
what they call a ‘modern view’ of enforcement opens up the field of those who could and 
should be considered responsible agents of international law enforcement, independent 
holders of remedial obligations. They argue that enforcement in international law 
encompasses both formal and informal mechanisms, and that there is nothing to prevent this 
potentially disparate set of enforcement practices being regarded as a comprehensive 
enforcement regime for international law. As they put it, broadening the conception of what 
an enforcement mechanism looks like ‘allows private enforcement, employs independent 
tribunals and courts to do the enforcing, and empowers those tribunals and courts to wield the 
same array of tools that domestic courts traditionally use to compel compliance with their 
decisions.’25 Writing to explain the specific nature of the enforcement of erga omnes 
obligations, Christian Tams gives a similar importance to the informal, decentralized 
processes of enforcement – contrasted to the regime specific mechanisms for enforcement, 
arguing that this is especially important in the context of enforcing erga omnes obligations.
26
 
These are not isolated arguments. In recent years the literature on global constitutionalism has 
appealed to a range of overlapping remedial processes or mechanisms as supplementing the 
formal architecture of international law, under the various headings of “new international 
institutional law”, “soft law”, and “global administrative law”. There are important 
differences here, and difficulties with each of these concepts, but the point is simply that  
international law’s enforcement capacity no longer self-evidently revolves solely around a 
state’s structurally privileged position in the international legal order.  
Understanding enforcement as an institutional capacity to exercise remedial powers 
challenges the notion of international enforcement having an anti-constitutional effect. In 
contrast to the sceptical conception of enforcement, my suggestion in this section was that the 
currency of enforcement is the institutional capacity of the legal order to delegate 
responsibilities rather than to effect compliance with specific rules. It follows that the type of 
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 RE Scott and PB Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) 3. 
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evidence to look for in assessing constitutional authority isn’t the practical mechanisms for 
policing compliance with international legal rules but the institutional mechanisms for 
allocating special responsibilities. The crucial measure of enforcement is the institutional 
capacity to effectively delegate responsibilities, and by doing so to shape the normative order 
governing international society. 
   
III. Constitutional enforcement in the free seas 
 
The ‘high seas’ is a legal term describing an area covering roughly 50% of the planet.27 The 
high seas are a transit to profit, carrying  an estimated 90% of global commerce,
28
 and a 
source of profit in their own right, with natural resources to be exploited on, in and under the 
sea. The term has historically been synonymous with the idea of the ‘free seas’, the 
designation of an open-access area immune from appropriation or legitimate command by 
any one state. This principle and accompanying customary international law establishes 
constitutional obligations but of limited scope, essentially protecting open access and 
freedom of movement; with remedial obligations limited to those of self-policing. As Hugo 
Grotius argued, any thicker rules of enforcement aren’t appropriate to this jurisdiction 
because no effective oversight could possibly be exercised. The high seas, he thought, are 
simply too big a domain for there to be any realistic hope of positive legal obligations being 
enforced. The only possibility left by the scale of the governance challenge is to embrace this 
as a domain of subjective right rather than objective duty. So freedom of the seas does not 
designate either a lack of constitutionality or a lack of enforcement, simply a self-policing 
governance regime characterized by negative responsibilities and freedoms – obligations not 
to act or to refrain from acting in a certain way – rather than positive responsibilities or 
freedoms – obligations to actively protect or promote the rules.29 The constitutional rules are 
set here by reference to this presumption in favour of the free seas.  
 Although the concept of the free seas and the associated laissez-faire governance 
regime is now firmly entrenched in customary international law, it has not always been 
                                                 
27
 See Global Governance Monitor: Oceans, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 December 2010, available at  
<http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-governance-monitor/p18985#/Oceans/Issue%20Brief/> accessed 10 
January 2012.  
28
 See <www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/keyfacts>, accessed 10 January 2012.  
29
 In this regard, see R Keohane and J Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (3
rd
 edn, 
Longman, New York, 2001); [they argue that the essential freedoms on which law of the sea is built provides a 
perfect analogy with the ordinary anarchical structure of international society, in which the essentially freedoms 
of sovereign statehood drive all other efforts at global governance]. 
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uncontested. In particular it needs to be remembered that the context for Grotius’ argument 
that the seas were essentially free, a mare liberum, was to provide a legal justification for the 
hotly contested practice of Dutch privateerism, notably Jacob van Heemskerk’s 1603 seizure 
of the Portuguese ship the Santa Catarina. In other words, Grotius wrote to provide a legal 
justification for fighting Spanish, Portuguese and, later, British claims to ownership - and by 
extension the rights of trade and access - of certain maritime domains by arguing that no-one 
could own the sea and, therefore, private actors were well within their rights to seize 
whatever they could. William Welwod and, later, John Selden opposed this, in support of 
British naval and colonial ambitions. As the title to Selden’s work suggested, the nub of the 
argument was that the seas were subject to the same appropriation as land-based territory 
was, and that as a result the ocean space was a mare clausum, a closed sea which could be 
and historically had been effectively appropriated and occupied through naval power.
30
  
The scale of these issues has been resolved to some extent by slimming the legal area 
designated as ‘high seas’ and extending the reach of state’s sovereign jurisdiction. Originally 
this was determined by the three mile rule – the high seas began at the limits of cannon shot; 
certainly a visible manifestation of the how freedom of the seas began at the limits of states’ 
enforcement ability. This became a 12 mile rule. And this in turn has been expanded through 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which introduces an Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends 200 nautical miles beyond a state’s territorial sea and 
creates thicker rights and responsibilities than those within the high seas domain. Although 
states don’t have legal ‘ownership’ of this area, they do have exclusive rights of access and 
use of this area – for example for fishing, or natural resource extraction. In the majority of 
cases these special rights create the conditions of de facto ownership. Correspondingly, it 
creates special responsibilities within this zone that narrow the (positive) enforcement gap in 
the law of the sea, although even here there are limits to how general this legal claim is.
31
 The 
important point though is that this 200 nautical mile geographical expansion of state 
jurisdiction, as with the earlier iterations, only really tinkers with the enforcement regime 
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suggested by the free seas framework. It’s a (regulatory) drop in the (governance) ocean, you 
might say.    
But the constitutional significance of this regime goes far beyond the establishment of 
the EEZ. This is – potentially – a challenge to the prevailing constitutional principle in favour 
of the freedom of the seas. UNCLOS challenges the narrow presumption that this domain is 
an area beyond effective juridical control by virtue of attempting to establish the law of the 
sea as a comprehensive, unified governing framework which could systematize the 
relationship between existing and future regimes tackling more specific regulatory 
challenges. The complexity of this field of governance is reflected in the issues covered, 
ranging from classical concerns with the delimitation of sovereign jurisdiction, piracy and 
high seas enforcement, to more modern concerns with the regulation of ships, environmental 
protection, and the right to national resources on, in and under the sea. It was in this light that 
Tommy Koh – who presided over the conference at which UNCLOS was adopted – hailed 
the framework as a ‘constitution for the oceans’. In this respect the “constitutionality”’ of 
UNCLOS is contained in the claim to provide a comprehensive, general and authoritative 
framework with the capacity to detail the appropriate rules for action on the oceans.
32
 All 
three of these aspects of constitutionality are contained in the claim that the rules 
systematized in UNCLOS reflect (for the most part) customary international law. The 
implication of this is that to the extent that UNCLOS embodies customary rules the 
enforcement regime it creates can claim the legitimate authority to direct the future 
development of law and governance in the this area.
33
 
The root scepticism is that this framework lacks the practical force necessary to 
generate a genuine claim to constitutional authority. Crucially, the customary basis of the 
core obligations regardless, the regime lacks the important constitutional hallmark of 
supremacy.
34
 Although this can be regarded as merely one black mark (albeit an important 
one) against an otherwise complete set of constitutional features, the lack of supremacy 
carries rather a lot of weight when it comes to assessing the constitutional character of a 
regime. As Dan Bodansky argues, this is because there is an important distinction between a 
governance regime possessing constitutional features, and the description of a set of rules as 
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a constitutional order.
35
 That UNCLOS systematizes customary international law in this 
domain only begs the additional question of the nature of customary international law’s claim 
to authority. Establishing a legitimate claim to pre-eminent or supreme authority is key to 
whether a legal regime can be understood as establishing constitutional order, both within the 
specific domain governed by law and as a part of a wider global constitutionalism in which 
principles specific to this regime reflect and strengthen more general principles of global 
public order. If UNCLOS lacks a mechanism for establishing pre-emptive authority over 
states, however, any claim to constitutional authority is, to use Jeffrey Dunoff’s term, a mere 
‘constitutional conceit’.36  
The interesting feature of this as far international law’s claim to constitutional 
authority goes is that evidence for the absence of constitutional authority hangs on scepticism 
about the viability of enforcement practices in the global ocean commons. Despite the 
regulatory advances, including the presence of international bodies empowered to settle 
disputes, the  suggestion is that very little has changed in practice since the golden days of 
privateerism which formed the backdrop for the debate between Grotius and Selden. As 
William Langewische argues in The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos and Crime, 
despite the rhetoric and regulation suggesting otherwise, the high seas are still ‘free’ in the 
most anarchic sense of the word; this is an area beyond authority, outside the effective reach 
of law.
37
 Langewische highlights how efforts to bring high seas actors under state and 
international jurisdiction have been stymied by the continued reliance on regulation through 
negative responsibilities, by the presumption of free and open access, and by the fact that 
what regulation there is ‘lacks teeth’, particularly in the continued reliance on the flag state 
regime as the key enforcement mechanism. The structure is premised on the good-faith 
commitment of the various actors in this domain to refrain from violating the rules, rather 
than any threat of punishment or sanction for having violated the rules. Regulation aside, this 
is still an essentially lawless domain governed by private rather than public mechanisms 
enforcement.  
The flag-state regime
38
 is a paradigm example of how the legacy of self-policing 
undermines the plausibility of an extant ‘constitution for the oceans’. The flag state regime 
essentially extends sovereign territoriality into the high seas by granting states jurisdiction – 
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hence enforcement powers – over ships flying their flag. On the surface this seems to 
delegate responsibilities in line with a practice of constitutional enforcement. The problem is 
that the standards of enforcement among the flag states vary widely, particularly in the 
‘genuine link’ they require from a vessel in order to be registered as a flag ship, and the level 
of oversight they exercise once registration has occurred.
39
 Because the flag state regime is a 
sizeable source of income for some states ship owners have been able to leverage their 
market position into loose regulations and few responsibilities; it’s a buyer’s market. In a 
reflection of why self-policing doesn’t work, and how “flags of convenience” have 
dominated the market, over 40% of vessels now fly the flags of either Panama, Liberia or the 
Marshall Islands.
40
 The income from this is substantial, meaning that states tend to treat ships 
flagged under their registry as clients rather than subjects. The end result of this 
marketization has been to make re-flagging ships an easy, penalty-free way to dodge 
regulatory oversight. Liberia provides one illustration of the weak interest some states will 
have in more proactively fulfilling their enforcement responsibilities under the flag-state 
mechanism. During the Liberian civil wars, where international sanctions restricted legitimate 
sources of state income, the Liberian Ship Registry accounted for some 70% of government 
income.
41
 With other flag states there is an even more direct challenge to global enforcement 
practices. North Korean and Cambodian flagged vessels, for instance, are known to engage in 
illicit trafficking of drugs, people and weapons, with the presumption of flag state jurisdiction 
restricting efforts to interdict and enforce prohibitions on transnational crime.
42
  
Port states and coast guards are in a position to pick up some of the slack this creates 
in the global enforcement regime. Port states can use their role as the gatekeepers to large and 
lucrative markets to demand repairs or issue fines for non-compliance with international 
standards. But port states are also in competition with each other, and there are few benefits 
from exercising anything but the most formal oversight; it is far easier simply to refuse entry 
rather than risk tying up dock space with a sick or unseaworthy ship.
43
 Similarly, the coast 
guard has interdiction powers if a ship is suspected of illicit trafficking once a ship has 
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entered territorial waters and regardless of the flag it flies. A network of bilateral treaties in 
which some states have ceded jurisdiction powers for the purposes of enforcement to other 
states – notably the US – who are regarded as better placed to exercise these enforcement 
powers extends enforcement authority beyond territorial waters. This is complemented by 
some multilateral enforcement regimes, both to prevent drug trafficking but also to police 
compliance with obligations relating to fishing stocks, weapons of mass destruction, and 
migration.
44
 But the enforcement regime this creates is far from universal, reliant in the first 
place the flag state’s willingness to cede such interdiction powers, on the strength of the 
treaty regime, and on the strategic interests powerful states have in policing the oceans or 
commanding the commons.
45
  
There are some exceptions to the limitations on enforcement imposed by the flag 
states regime. There is a universal right to inspect ships suspected of piracy, slavery, 
unauthorized broadcasting or lacking a nationality.
46
 This is certainly not an extensive range 
of issues but, even so, the enforcement regime fails to create positive responsibilities of 
enforcement, promising much more enforcement capacity than it delivers in practice. The 
difficulty of responding to piracy in the Gulf of Aden is one example of how the general and 
non-specific nature of the interdiction regime has resolutely failed to translate into a practice 
of constitutional enforcement.
47
 Reflecting this, those states engaged in counter-piracy 
operations off the coast of Somalia (and now within Somalia) have resolutely rejected 
suggestions that this is anything but a short term operation. To this end, counter-piracy 
enforcement practices have been structured in such a way as to avoid any link to 
generalizable – constitutional – responsibilities of enforcement, either for the naval forces 
involved in policing the seas or as a judicial matter in terms of establishing a responsibility to 
try captured pirates.  
Although piracy and trafficking have, for good reasons, generated the headlines in this 
area, in terms of international law’s constitutional authority the greatest challenge is from 
ordinary, everyday practices of legal oversight. It is the everyday nature of the failings here 
that does most to feed the perception that this is an unconstitutional legal order defined by 
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sovereign exceptionalism and private ‘plunder’. In one memorable story used to illustrate the 
essential lawlessness of this domain, Langewische recounts how the family of one victim – 
Dianne Brimble – has faced an eight year battle for justice, despite the presence of chilling 
photographic evidence showing her being raped while unconscious, by multiple men, the 
same men in who’s cabin she was later found dead in.48 Rather than questioning those 
involved when the ship docked, the body was removed, the men were allowed access to their 
cabin, the ship continued on its journey, and the investigation that would normally have 
happened as a matter of course was never begun in earnest. There are now criminal 
proceedings against some of these men, but the point to take away here is that this is an 
extreme but not an exceptional case. Deaths on cruise ships often go down as accidents, 
suicides or disappearances; prosecutions for crime at sea are rare, partly as a result of 
investigative responsibilities falling on the cruise companies. The ordinary default mindset of 
states is that they are not positively responsible for law enforcement on the high seas. This is 
a domain where self-regulation is the norm.   
This same fall-back tendency of states to think that their legal responsibilities don’t 
extend to the high seas is part of a more pernicious practice of states using the perceived 
weakness of their enforcement responsibilities in this domain as a way to contract around 
international human rights obligations. This mindset is most evident in the detention of ‘boat 
people’ on Christmas Island, in which the ordinary human rights of migrants and refugees are 
seen as inoperative because these individuals are still in a technical legal sense ‘at sea’. There 
are signs too of the Australian approach – the ‘Pacific Island Solution’49 – being considered 
elsewhere, for example in Canada where the arrival of 492 Tamil refugees on the MV Sun Sea 
was met by calls from some quarters to install a refugee holding ship outside of Canada’s 
territorial waters; hence, to hold them on the high seas beyond the sphere of Canada’s human 
rights and refugee obligations. These proposals highlight the perception that the high seas 
legal regime doesn’t just lack an enforcement regime but actively neuters the positive 
responsibilities arising in overlapping areas of international law. And the principles 
endangered aren’t marginal; the specific challenge is to the peremptory principle of non-
refoulement.
50
 In an extension of this, positive responsibilities of rescue are increasingly 
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contracted out to states with far less compunction about adhering to their international legal 
obligations, in much the same way that the judicial responsibilities accrued during counter-
piracy action are passed on to institutionally weak states.
51
 As Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Tanja Aalberts argue, the tragedy of this domain is that ‘the “drowning migrant” finds 
herself subject to an increasingly complex field of governance, in which participating states 
may successfully barter off and deconstruct responsibilities by reference to traditional norms 
of sovereignty and international law. Thus, rather than simply a space of non-sovereignty per 
se, the Mare Liberum becomes the venue for a range of competing claims and disclaims to 
sovereignty’.52 
All of this points to how the perception of international law’s limited institutional 
capacity for enforcement bolsters sceptical arguments regarding international law’s 
constitutional authority. The various practices undertaken and sustained with reference to the 
law of the sea shows how gaps in the enforcement regime creates and sustains scepticism 
about the constitutional authority of the wider legal order. It may be a comprehensive regime 
on paper, in formal terms decisively shifting the terms of governance away from a 
presumption in favour of the free seas, but there is little respect for the constitutionality of 
these rules in practice. The lack of ‘hard’ enforcement mechanisms and the reliance on a 
process of self-policing create a sense, at least among the subjects of this legal order, that this 
is, at best, a regulatory regime imposing few actionable enforcement obligations, appealing 
instead to a weak, non-justiciable sense of responsibility. And where states do support 
enforcement measures – for example against ‘boat people’ – this is part of a strategy to 
declaim more onerous responsibilities, rather than to give constitutional effect to the law of 
the sea. There is, in other words, plenty of available evidence for the fact that international 
law in this domain lacks constitutional authority, at least as long as the appropriate measure 
of constitutional authority or supremacy is tied to a general capacity to get states to comply 
with their enforcement responsibilities.  
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IV. Constitutional Enforcement in the Global Commons 
 
So far, so sceptical. In this last section, however, I want to point to ways that constitutional 
enforcement is being developed in this domain, specifically through the institutional 
delegation of enforcement responsibility. The point is to show how looking for institutional 
practices of responsibility delegation creates a much rounder picture of how enforcement 
constructs constitutional authority than is likely to emerge from the sceptic’s analysis.  
Support for seeing the law of the sea as an example of international law’s 
constitutional authority comes from perception that the law of the sea is but one aspect of an 
emerging “global commons law”. The global commons refers to those areas that are the 
‘common property of all mankind’.53 In John Vogler’s words, the global commons are ‘areas 
or resources that do not or cannot by their very nature fall under sovereign jurisdiction’.54 
Susan J. Buck similarly defines the commons as ‘resource domains in which common pool 
resources are found’, by extension seeing international or global commons as ‘the very large 
resource domains that do not fall within the jurisdiction of any one country’.55 This idea 
denotes the oceans and deep-sea bed, the atmosphere and global environment, outer space, 
areas of special ecological and cultural significance and, increasingly, cyberspace.
56
 The 
governance challenge is set by the ever-present spectre of “tragedy”; as Garrett Hardin 
famously argued, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is that you have an area designated either by 
nature or social convention as open access, hence as beyond the effective control of any one 
actor or institution, designated unmanageable.
57
 But at the same time, without some measure 
of control or cooperation to manage the (scarce) resource, the commons would over time 
degrade and become unusable. The tragedy here is that the open access model creates a 
structural lack of adequate incentives to regulatory cooperation. The promise of the global 
commons, providing common pool resources, also has the potential to function as a global 
sink, threatening independent resources.
58
 Extending from Hardin’s conception of the tragic 
is the inevitability that legal rules promising to govern the commons will fail to fulfil this 
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function, at least as long as they protect a presumption in favour of free and open access. 
Here of course the ‘free seas’ become a paradigm example of the tragedy of the commons.  
Since Hardin’s pessimistic, rational-actor model, others have pointed to how common 
pool resources such as the high seas can be effectively governed if the “communal” nature of 
the domain is taken seriously. Elinor Ostrom in particular has detailed how local, non-
centralized governance models provide lessons for effective commons management which 
can be ramped up to manage national, regional or global commons. Where common pool 
resources have been managed effectively it is because the governance framework 
acknowledged that a centralized, top-down regulatory framework was inappropriate but, 
crucially, where there was also an exceptionally strong sense among those at the point of 
enforcement regarding the responsibilities owed as part of accessing this domain. Ostrom’s 
point is that the tragedy of the commons gives us the terms of the governance challenge, 
rather than pointing to the impossibility of governance itself.
59
 The institutionally driven re-
orientation of (some aspects of) the law of the sea as a framework for protecting either ‘our 
common heritage’ or ‘our common threat’ or ‘our common responsibility’ can be read as an 
effort to provide an institutional protection for this culture of responsibility, through the 
delegation of enforcement responsibilities.  
The basis for this institutional shift is provided, in part, by the way that the structure 
of these obligations has spilled beyond – if it was ever truly contained within – the UNCLOS 
framework. The structure of the treaty obligations constrains the prospects for international 
enforcement by suggesting that it is the bilateral, or, in the case of a multilateral treaty, the 
bilateralizable relationships of responsibility that condition and protect the authority of 
international law. The reason is that this structure allocates enforcement responsibilities 
through the principle of reciprocity,  where a harm against one state’s interests creating a 
right of enforcement or redress. Where obligations are structured in this way it is difficult to 
understand the international legal order as a genuine reflection of a genuine community 
interest, or states as enforcing a community standard. All of the necessary remedial rules are 
contained in and limited by this bilateral structure of state responsibility. If the practice of 
enforcement is triggered by the harm done to an individual state, what triggers enforcement 
to redress the harm done to the international community? The sceptic’s suggestion is that the 
constitutional value or principle needs to be, and potentially can be, pursued and enforced 
through the traditional bilateral structures of international law. There isn’t a need for 
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international law to move beyond the horizontal model and establish more hierarchical 
enforcement mechanisms for delegating responsibilities, because these responsibilities are 
already sufficiently delegated, albeit through the negative responsibilities characterising the 
free seas principle. There can be constitutional authority even in the absence of anything 
more than a power to persuade.   
As the limitations of enforcement in the “free seas” suggests, however,  the bilateral 
structure of enforcement leaves a number of gaps through which states can wriggle out of 
their responsibilities. The overarching cause of the worry – and legal gap – is the fact that not 
all states are signed up to what has the potential to be ‘a resounding success for the principles 
and purposes of the UN, including, crucially, progress towards the rule of law in international 
affairs’.60 UNCLOS lacks the supremacy it would get from a universal acceptance, and as a 
result lacks the power to unsettle the customary presumption of free and open access, at least 
in any coherent and comprehensive manner.
61
 But, on the surface, who or who hasn’t signed 
up to UNCLOS shouldn’t matter for the authority of the obligations created because the 
majority are also obligations under customary international law. The real gap is not in the 
enforcement regime of UNCLOS, but the gaps in the wider constitutional enforcement 
regime for the most important  customary, constitutional rules of international law.   The 
problem is that not all customary rules have a bilateral, or even a bilateralizable, structure. 
The law of the sea in particular establishes rules with an essentially interdependent structure. 
As a matter of assigning remedial responsibilities it is not just the affected state whose 
enforcement responsibilities can be triggered, but all states as common members of the 
international community, as holders of a common interest.    
This is the context in which the emergence of the law of the sea as an aspect of global 
commons law has helped institutionalize a practice of constitutional enforcement. Particularly 
important here is the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.62 Although 
this principle has emerged in the specific context of international environmental law, it has 
become the unifying thread to many recent efforts to manage the global commons more 
broadly, and to give constitutional bite to enforcement practices. In effect, the global 
commons concept functions to usher in the idea that an underlying obligation of trusteeship, 
or responsible stewardship, sets the scope of legitimate enforcement authority in this 
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domain.
63
 Responsibilities are allocated to the actor best placed to protect the global 
commons. The fact that these environmental responsibilities have been developed in relation 
to the basic idea that the agent best placed to act also has a responsibility to act forces 
positive responsibilities into existence.  International institutions are empowered in this way 
to remedy international law’s constitutional authority by targeted and specifying state 
responsibilities in this domain. Whether or not it replaces the previously benign protection 
regime, principally defined around the rights of access and duties of the flag state, it certainly 
challenges the degree to which practices of declamation can undermine the constitutional 
order. International institutions in this sense act to make sure the structural failure of states to 
comply with their responsibilities don’t inevitably corrupt the possibility for constitutional 
authority, reflecting the institutional concept of constitutional enforcement.   
UNCLOS establishes two particularly important institutional bodies whose officials 
increasingly take on this kind of enforcement role. The International Seabed Authority and 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) have both been actively engaged in 
pushing back against the actions of states and their proxy on the high seas and deep seabed. 
For example, the International Seabed Authority has recently requested an advisory opinion 
from ITLOS on the nature of states’ obligations and responsibilities in sponsoring seabed 
mining and exploration; in its judgment the Tribunal leaves very little room for doubt about 
the extent of states’ obligations and responsibilities, and about the oversight capabilities 
granted to the International Seabed Authority.
64
 ITLOS in turn has also claimed jurisdiction 
over national port authorities, notably in the Juno Trader case, using its limited compulsory 
jurisdiction to full effect and in the process both solidifying and expanding the scope of its 
own authority.
65
 The operation of UNCLOS is also actively orchestrated by the Division on 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, a branch of the UN Office of Legal Counsel, which 
acts as the Secretariat for UNCLOS. They are responsible for drafting the UN Secretary-
General’s report on the law of the sea for the General Assembly, a role which they have 
explicitly interpreted as involving the progressive codification of the law of the sea. 
Indicative of this is the setting up of the ‘Ad-Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to 
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study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity 
beyond areas of national jurisdiction’. This inauspiciously titled body has had a key role in 
developing the concept of a ‘marine protected area’, which has in turn been used to further 
elaborate the positive responsibilities of trusteeship held by states and other actors.
66
  
 There is a security dimension to the global commons too, which takes up Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s suggestion that to control this ‘wide common, over which men may pass in 
all directions’ is to hold the reigns of imperial domination.67 Vogler argues that this 
perspective on the global commons is fundamentally different from that of environmental 
actors. Referencing Barry Posen’s analysis, he points to how the injunction to command the 
commons is part of a hegemonic foreign policy practice.
68
 By commanding the commons, the 
suggestion is that a powerful state can essentially free itself from all constraints – including, 
one assumes, those of international law. But this has changed too, as the threats from a failure 
to effectively police the global commons have grown. Security actors are increasingly 
accepting that given the limits of unilateral enforcement in the global commons there are 
significantly higher pay-offs from coordinating enforcement efforts. As Tara Murphy puts it, 
in the global commons ‘the security of one is tightly linked to the security of all.’69 As part of 
this general effort to preserve freedom of movement and trade, counter-piracy efforts begin to 
look like part of a general practice of constitutional enforcement rather than a narrow practice 
directed at Somali pirates. One of the mechanisms through which UN Security Council has 
sought to address the growing threat of piracy (especially in UNSC resolutions 1816 and 
1846) has been to strengthen the principles governing the use of force in counter-piracy 
operations. This has helped resolve some of the gaps in the UNCLOS enforcement regime on 
piracy, specifically the uncertainty about who was responsible for policing piracy, who could 
legitimately be employed to strengthen the enforcement regime (including private security 
companies), and the measures that could and should be taken (including intervention to attack 
pirate bases). It is precisely because the Security Council’s role here was directed at giving 
‘maximum effect’ to the international prohibition on piracy that it becomes a practice 
strengthening the constitutional order rather than undermining it. This highlights the way that 
a practice of constitutional enforcement can emerge despite the express efforts from states to 
prevent enforcement practices having this effect.   
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 This is as much about how institutional practices reflect an ongoing 
internationalisation of “officialdom” – of international forms of institutional authority – as it 
does a shift from the free seas to the global commons as the principle governing the 
allocation of enforcement responsibilities. For example, the capacity to act on the ‘common 
threat’ of piracy reflects the increasing functional importance of international institutional 
authority, captured by the UN Secretary-General’s report ‘A more secure world: our common 
responsibilities’.70 One among a raft of recent attempts to reconcile the role of international 
institutions as public authorities, rather than mere venues for private forms of cooperation. 
The point isn’t the importance of any single report or practice, but the  institutionalisation of 
an international authority to delegate responsibilities. This is in danger of being overly 
general, but the law of the sea regime establishes the enforcement capacity – the capacity to 
delegate responsibilities - of a number of specific institutional actors, all empowered with the 
common purpose to promote what Tommy Koh called the ‘common dream’ of enacting the 
constitution for the oceans.
71
  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
I suggested at the beginning of this article that at the core of the sceptic’s position was a 
belief that the constitutional order was too weak to support a conception of international law 
enforcement as a constitutional practice. For a start the mechanics of enforcement are under-
developed: there is no global police force or comprehensive judicial system with the power to 
give effect to the obligations. More fundamentally, because of ambiguity surrounding the 
constitutional rules, enforcement practices retrench state power, rather than strengthening the 
independent, constitutional type authority of international law. The result of this institutional 
weakness is that where it looks like international law is being enforced, this is not 
“constitutional enforcement” but simply the imposition of a contingent political reality. What 
I have presented here is evidence for an alternative perspective based on the institutional 
functions of the international legal order. The transitional from the free seas to the global 
commons in the law of the sea highlights how the levers of effective and constitutionally 
legitimate enforcement are in place and are being used by institutional actors to remedy 
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international law’s constitutional authority. This clearly isn’t enough to address some of the 
gaps in the comprehensiveness of the regime, including the abuses continuing to take place in 
the global commons. But the possibility that the subjects of law might not comply with their 
responsibilities is hardly the point, at least from this institutional perspective. As long as the 
institutional agents are themselves are empowered to apportion responsibilities and enact 
international law in a way that protects the core constitutional principles – or better, as long 
as they perceive themselves to hold such a role – there is no basis for scepticism about the 
constitutional effect of international enforcement. In this respect at least, international law 
does offers a viable model of constitutional enforcement, at least in its capacity to command 
the global commons.   
 
 
